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DE-PRIVATIZING RELIGION and RE-VITALIZING CITIZENSHIP

with

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1798 Scenic Avenue, Berkeley

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De-Privatizing Faith and Re-Vitalizing Citizenship

GTU Distinguished Lecture, Nov. 15, 1995

Draft: Chapter three

John A. Coleman S.J.

There is an implied colon after the title of this chapter. The sub-title reads: civil society, citizenship and religion. I am going to be wrestling with some conceptual clarifications about the meaning of civil society and citizenship and their mutual inter-relationship. This clarification will serve to direct the ways we deal with these two topics in our six case studies. I will also try to uncover how these two realities of civil society and citizenship get intertwined with, even anchored by, religion. Throughout this research project, we will are concerned with both how the process of de-privatizing faith nurtures and feeds into a revitalized citizenship and how working to achieve a revitalized citizenship presents challenges to contemporary American faith life.

Defining civil society and citizenship is no easy task since both realities include both descriptive and normative aspects and each is an essentially sharply contrived concept. Thus, we need to ask about which version of civil society and which account of citizenship we want to move forward. We are also entering onto no less strongly contested ground as we try to link civil society and citizenship to a religious source in discipleship. Besides conceptual clarification, I want to construe an argument which: (a) privileges civil society as the foremost terrain of a renewed democratic citizenship; (b) locates citizenship primarily in the sector of civil society rather than the state (and, more, not even exclusively in the
directly political domain as such); and (c) contends that civil society is the appropriate sector for the citizenship activity of the public church. Even more strongly, I will contend that the fate of the public church and a vital and public civil society rise and fall together.

**Re-Discovering Civil Society**

A high level, if little noticed or commented on, academic gathering took place in the fall of 1989 in Rome. Prominent political philosophers, social scientists and theologians from both western and eastern Europe—including such well-known intellectuals as Germany's Jurgen Habermas and John Baptiste Metz and Poland's Adam Michnik—came together in a special convocation by the Vatican Council on Culture to discuss the topic, civil society. The former university professor, now pope, Karl Woytyla, despite a punishing schedule, made certain that he was in continuous attendance at all of the several days' sessions. One of the very few North American commentators to even notice this meeting, the *New York Times* columnist, William Safire, stated in a column he wrote at the time that this scholarly gathering just might be the most important academic symposium of that or many a year.

No one familiar with the democratic opposition movements in Eastern Europe, just then coming into ascendancy, should have been surprised that this pope from the east was deeply interested in the topic of civil society. For as his fellow countryman, Adam Michnik, had noted when writing about *Solidarity* in Poland: "The essence of the spontaneously growing independent and self-governing labor union, *Solidarity*, lay in the restoration of social ties, self-organization aimed at guaranteeing the defense of labor, civil and national rights. For the first time in the history of communist rule in Poland, 'civil society' was being restored and it was reaching a compromise with the state." (1) While still in
opposition, Michnik had argued in an important essay, entitled, "A New Evolutionism", that the opposition in eastern Europe differed from party revisionist reformers and neo-positivist technocrats. "I believe what sets today's opposition apart from [these other groups] is the belief that a program for evolution ought to be addressed to an independent public, not to power. Such a program should give directives to people on how to behave, not to the powers on how to reform themselves. Nothing instructs the authorities better than pressure from below." (2)

We find here, in germ, a preliminary definition of civil society: it involves self-organization, addresses an independent public not totally subservient to the state or in the pocket of comprehensive catch-all political parties. Harry Boyte who has written so meaningfully on a citizen-politics in the United States offers this definition: "A citizen-centered politics recreates the concept of a public realm, [different from the institutionalized forms of directly political life], in which diverse groups learn to work together effectively to address public problems, whether or not they like one another personally or agree on other issues". (3) This public societal realm of discourse and community decision is conceived of as a kind of "second culture", to borrow a phrase from Vaclav Havel.

Havel has asserted that "the original and most independent sphere of activity, one that predetermines all the others, is simply an attempt to create and support the independent life of society." (4) Only in this independent sector, wedged between the logic of the market (which is driven by profitability and competition) and the logic of the state (with its essential thrust toward administrative bureaucracy), could the essential aims of plurality, diversity, independent self-constitution and self-organization, moving toward the fulfillment of freedom,
counteract the economic and political systems' demands for conformity, uniformity and technical-rational discipline steered by the twin "bottom lines" of money and power. Like many of the eastern European democratic opposition, Havel envisioned a notion of citizenship exercised in the name of civil society, if need be against the state. This view of citizenship aims at rediscovering and restoring civil society since, it is argued, only in this realm can citizens hope for a rehabilitation in everyday and tangibly accessible life of values such as trust, openness, responsibility, love and solidarity to replace the cynicism of the narrow ideals of a manipulative or passive citizenship sponsored by the state or elite experts.

In his now classic samizdat essay, "The Power of the Powerless", Havel looked to this independent sector as crucial to de-centering the totalitarian pretensions of the omnicompetent state. Havel's politics articulated a vision akin to the stress in Catholic social teaching on mediating institutions, what the Catholic tradition calls subsidiarity. "Every society", claims Havel, "requires some degree of organization, of course. Yet, if that organization is to serve people and not the other way around, then people will have to be liberated and space created so that they may organize themselves in meaningful ways." (5) The democratic opposition, Havel contended, turns away from "abstract political visions of the future toward concrete human beings and ways of defending them effectively in the here and now." (6) For this to happen, we need to emphasize a politics of scale, the voluntary sector of civil society: "There can and must be structures that are open, dynamic and small: beyond a certain point, human ties, like personal trust and personal responsibility cannot work... The authority of these structures cannot be based on long-empty traditions, like the tradition of mass political parties, but rather on how, in concrete terms, they enter into a
given situation....These structures should naturally arise from below as a consequence of authentic 'self-organization'. They should gain their vital energy from a living dialogue with the genuine needs from which they arise. (7) In Havel's words we hear something like the vision of Harry Boyte and Sarah Evans when they point to what they call "free public spaces" of community action and decision. (8) 

Latin America's Civil Society Project

Nor is the rediscovery of civil society restricted to the eastern European bloc. In Latin America, the church has been engaging for several decades in a new form of ecclesial organization, the so-called base-community movement. These small groups of Christians combine prayer, scripture and what we in North America call community organizing techniques to get essential services such as water, sewerage and bus service delivered to the favellas of Lima, Caracas and Sao Paulo. In Latin America, too, the essential goal is the creation of intermediate and mediating organizations for health, education and day care, popular organizations for workers and mothers, with the aim of building an embryonic civil society in nations which have heretofore known only the power of the state and of elite and oligarchical political parties tied narrowly to the state and corporate business. Embodying a democratic ethos, these intermediate organizations advocate an enhanced democracy for their whole societies. As one of the Las Madres in Argentina, who daily keened forth justice for their disappeared children in the central plaza of Buenos Aires, put it to Jean Bethke Elshtain in interviews she held with them: "We, too, must behave democratically in our movement if we are to advocate democracy for our society." (9)
North American political scientists who have studied the new political stance of the church in Latin America, far from echoing the misleading and inflammatory rhetoric of armed revolution to describe this new movement or seeing it as a Trojan horse for Marxist conspiracies, point to the essential contribution of base communities in providing a school of political education in democratic participation in societies which have classically been elitist and oligarchical and in which the ordinary citizen has been powerless to determine in any real way the directions in which public policy discussions take place or political decisions are made.

Scott Mainwaring, one of the most astute observers of this changing church in Latin America puts it this way in his study, *The Catholic Church and Politics in Brazil*: "It has been the church’s role in empowering civil society (especially in the popular movements) rather than its negotiations with the local political elite that has been most significant." (10) The church empowers civil society, first, by training ordinary, even poor, people in transferable leadership skills in the basic community: skills of speaking, convoking a meeting, gathering people together, pursuing public discussions about issues of concern and moment in their society. Secondly, by outreach through the popular organizations, it teaches people that, through community organizing skills, they can have voice and influence in the decisions about their life in their neighborhoods and places of work. Not surprisingly, many secular political analysts in Latin America have begun to highlight the need to rebuild (or construct for the first time) a viable civil society.(11)
Finally, in North America and Europe, where the voluntary sector, especially in the American case, has been the historic seed-bed of a republican citizenry, new threats to the viability of civil society have raised serious questions about the future of the kind of civil society on which our politics has been traditionally premised. Jeffrey Golfarb, for example, wrote a book with the chilling title, The Cynical Society, in which he sketches the anatomy of a new American cynicism about the political system at least analogous to that cynicism which eventually led to the precipitous collapse of the eastern European authoritarian regimes. (12)

A recent sociological study, based on focus group discussions among involved American citizens, found that people depend on "little-noticed meeting places—places of worship, libraries, community halls, where they can interact with others, offer their own thinking and become committed to, and somethimes engaged in the solution [to a political question or problem]. These places are becoming fewer, the researchers said." (13) The fewer such civic sites, the more likely the kind of increasingly cynical politics and the diminution of the sense of citizenship I sketched in chapter one.

Harvard University political scientist, Robert Putnam presents us with some dramatic evidence of declines in the sites for the associations of civil society in America. The PTA, the League of Women Voters, fraternal and sororal organizations such as the Lions, Elks, Shriners, The Eastern Star, members of unions and business groups such as the Jaycees—all show intense declension in membership, ranging from a twenty to almost a fifty percent drop in the past two decades. The number of Americans who say that they have attended a public meeting on city issues or school affairs has fallen by more than a third since 1973. Not only
do Americans—as we saw in chapter one—exhibit genuine distrust of actions of their national government (rising from 30 percent in 1966 to 75 percent in 1992) but a majority of them also increasingly claim that they can not even trust their fellow citizens. (14)

We have come a long way since Tocqueville’s picture of us a century and half ago as a vigorous voluntary society and democracy. A modern day French political scientist, Michael Crozier, in his book, *The Trouble with America: Why the System is Breaking Down*, could write that, despite his great respect for the United States, he was frightened by the changes that had taken place in this country between his first extended stay in 1946 and a subsequent sojourn in the 1980’s. In Crozier’s words, the United States had abandoned Tocqueville’s hoped for "free schools of civic virtue" in American associational life: "The United States today is no longer the America Tocqueville described. Its voluntary associations have ceased to be the mainstay of a democracy constantly on the move but are now simply means of self-defense for various parochial interests... This breakdown of community structures is what has made America a country full of anxiety and periodically shaken by reactionary crusades." (15) No less than the Czechoslovakian dissidents Havel wrote about, Americans, too, increasingly long for some rebirth of civility and the decent virtues of personal trust, openness, personal responsibility, solidarity, compassionate care for the fragile and broken in our midst, love.

**Variant Conceptions of Civil Society**

Perhaps just because of these growing anxieties and the discontents of American citizenship, the literature on civil society has grown apace—indeed, has become a kind of cottage industry—since that papal symposium on civil society in 1989. It soon becomes
apparent, however, to careful students of this scholarly literature that in it they encounter competing, even irreconcilable, definitions of civil society. On the right, from those who mainly fear the danger of an overly-administered state, we hear cries for a new volunteerism such as William Buckley's plea for a national service obligation for the young or President Bush's paeon to "a thousand points of light". I miss, in this discourse from the right, sufficient attention to the reality that the government, while it may not have a monopoly on this care, nevertheless has a primary and indispensable care for the common good. I also miss any sensitivity to the extent to which many of the associations of civil society (from arts organizations to non-profit health groups and private universities to welfare agencies such as The Salvation Army or Catholic Charities which deliver services to the poor) depend deeply on governmental support for their budgets and resources. Few knowledgeable agents of such voluntary associations think that it is very realistic that, absent government subsidies, they can continue to provide the level and quality of services they presently deliver, let alone expand them to meet the growing welfare needs of the American population. (16)

On the left, we hear social democrats such as Gar Alperovitz calling for renewed civil society as a space of community organization against the omniscient power of corporations, in fighting plant closings etc. I miss in many of these discussions a tutored sense of the inherent limits to the full-scale introduction of political modalities or democratic procedures into the economy or the business firm. At times, the programs of some of these social democrats seem to approximate the now discredited and failed notions of worker democracies in running industrial plants and industries which even a socialism with a human face came to see were economically unfeasible. (17) In any case, often, these social
democratic views of civil society still seem to imagine an overly mobilized and politicized civil society which might render governments unable sufficiently to govern and leave economies crippled in their efforts to innovate and become efficient.

The Competing Models

A rough typology of the several competing models of civil society would need to distinguish the liberal, neo-conservative, anarchist, undifferentiated and strong democracy versions of civil society as an idea and social project. Thus, for example, the liberal version tends to rely on an overly individualistic concept of civil society. Civil society remains 'the private' sector in the strict sense of the term and is even named as such. Most liberal accounts of civil society leave it fully de-politicized, defenseless against the eroding forces of a market economy. Civil society, in the liberal version, secures individual rights but remains essentially without resources to address the fragility of the individual before the onslaught of giant industrial firms and governmental bureaucracy. Nor can liberalism make room, in its theory, for the important role of social movements as a protest against the 'colonization' of civil society by states and markets. Neither does it support any aggressive attempts, through social movements of protest and reconfiguration, to not only defend 'the private' sphere but move it into a more public arena where it confronts state and economy to make them more publicly accountable, inclusive and participatory. Yet, when all is said, the liberal version does remind us that civil society remains also, in part, a private realm. In Jean Bethke Elshtain's fine phrase, it is the place which leaves social space for "difference, dissent, refusal and indifference." (18)
The neo-conservative model of civil society— as it is found, for example, in Peter Berger and Richard Neuhaus' influential book on mediating institutions—sees civil society almost entirely as a defense against the state. The neo-conservatives tend to identify the freedom of civil society with the market. What remains outside the market sphere—what neo-conservatives see as the essentially non-political cultural domain—must be shored up and reintegrated through a conservative retrotraditionalizing cultural model that will help to reinvigorate the market, now suffering cultural deficit. Concretely, hedonism, the loss of a Protestant work ethic and a sense of economic responsibility as well as the decline of respect for traditional authorities in state, church and elite culture become major targets—in the neo-conservative view— for the cultural work in civil society. Both liberals and neo-conservatives exhibit systematic bias against seeing the dangers of an imperialism of the market or the concomitant trivialization of genuine human choice and deliberation when it becomes reduced to mere consumer preference. (19)

While the neo-conservatives are frequently right in rubbing our noses in the genuine dysfunctions of the regulatory welfare state and the way it can erode human responsibility by turning citizens into passive clients, they remain less sensitive to the equal danger to a democratic citizenship when the untrammelled economy turns citizens into consumers. Worse still, some of them suggest a vulgar consumer metaphor for the very meaning of citizenship, as in Ross Perot's promoting of an electronic town meeting where citizens would press preference buttons on cue in the midst of a televised discussion, but where there is very little space for authentic public debate, genuine change of mind because of arguments proffered and true formation of collective will.)(20) Long ago, Hubert Blumer rightly protested against
this degeneration of authentic public opinion into a mere cumulative sorting of individual preferences without the mediation of public argument about what social goods we really should prefer. (21)

Anarchist models of civil society forget that a differentiated state apparatus remains indispensable in modern complex societies as a steering mechanism to give directionality to society. Some authoritative institution must serve society both to aggregate demands and forge compromise solutions to multiple and conflicting demands. Some such institution must initiate and take responsibility for the institutionalization and monitoring of public policy. Anarchists tend to be much too optimistic about human goodness and lack an appropriate vision of the human as fragile, flawed, susceptible to corruption yet capable of finite flashes of goodness. (22) Theories of civil society should not scot or diminish the state.

Undifferentiated models of civil society of a nostalgic type—what I like to call' the longing for good old Gemeinschaft'—forget that "abolishing the state, which is impossible in fact but certainly imaginable, would lead not to an autonomous plural civil society in other ways resembling its modern forerunner but to a restoration of traditional political-civil society without modern administration but also without a modern structure of rights and liberties carving out autonomous spaces from the world of politics." (23)

**Defining Civil Society**

I am going to draw primarily on three sources to anchor my discussion and definition of civil society: Michael Walzer, Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato and Robert Putnam.

**The Idea of Civil Society**
In his 1990 Gunmar Myrdal lecture, "The Idea of Civil Society", Michael Walzer defines it as "the space of uncoerced human association and also the set of relational networks—formed for the sake of family, faith, interest and ideology—that fill this space."

(23) Walzer laments that "we have been thinking too much about social formations different from, in competition with, civil society and so we have neglected the networks through which civility is produced and reproduced." (24)

Walzer contrasts his own emphasis on rebuilding civil society as a path of social reconstruction with four other nineteenth and twentieth century answers to the generating question: "what is the preferred setting, the most supportive environment, for the good life?" (25) From the left, as one answer, comes the ideal of a direct, unitary and participatory democracy. In a variant of Oscar Wilde’s famous retort that he was not a socialist because—as the modernist dandy Wilde saw it—"it would simply occupy too many of my evenings", Walzer argues that "despite the singlemindedness of republican ideology, politics rarely engages the full attention of the citizens who are supposed to be its chief protagonists." (26)

Citizens have far too many other things besides direct engagement in politics occupying their time and energy: making a living, raising a family, pursuing relationships and hobbies, engaging a private life. Thus, it is not so much that the Athenian ideal of a direct participatory democracy is not a good life as "that it isn't the 'real life' of very many people in the modern world." (27) Moreover, the decisions made by a modern complex state can never be placed fully into the directly democratic hands of citizens. The large scale of modern social life, the increasing (and necessary) bureaucratization of the state apparatus and the growing technicality of the decisions it is necessary to make in determining complex
public policy, dictate that "the participation of ordinary men and women in the activities of
the state (unless they are state employees) is largely vicarious." (28)

A second left response to the query about the preferred setting for the good life
focuses less on republican politics than on economic activity. The classic Marxist rejoinder,
when asked about the ideal locus of the good life, points to a cooperative economy, where we
are all bona fide producers and labor is immune from alienation, uncoerced and creative.
Walzer puts his finger on the characteristic Achilles' wound in the classic Marxist position
when he states, "But this version of the cooperative economy is set against an unbelievable
background—a non-political state, regulation without conflict, "the administration of things."
In every actual experience of socialist politics, the state has moved rapidly into the
foreground." (29)

A third response, this time from the capitalist camp, proposes the marketplace as both
mechanism and prime metaphor when thinking about the preferred setting for the good life.
The problem with the market, however, when it gets set up as an all-encompassing ideal and
model of social life—it is a mistake to make it so even for the whole of the economy, let
alone to extrapolate this market model to civil society as a whole—is that "the marketplace
provides no support for social solidarity." (30) In point of fact, people come to the arena of
the marketplace with radically unequal resources. The vaunted equal opportunity utopia and
the untrammeled freedom supposedly ingredient in the market is illusory for those in penury
or of marginal and meager resources. As Walzer comments: "Capitalism in its ideal form,
like socialism again, does not make for citizenship...Citizens are transformed [by an
exaggerated market logic] into autonomous consumers." Capitalism does not make for
citizenship because capitalists, themselves, make lackluster citizens. "Because the market has no political boundaries, entrepreneurs also evade social control. They need the state but have no loyalty to it." (31)

Nationalism is the final proposed candidate as the ideal answer to the question of the preferred setting for the good life. Loyal members of the nation, bound together by ties of blood and history, should find the good life in their shared heritage and communalism. Yet any nationalism, unanchored, first, in a broader vision of universal human rights and, secondly, in the modern sense of being a nation of citizens, (each of which tempers and relativizes nationalism) becomes devoid of real content and directionality. (32)" Every nationalist will, of course, find value in his or her own heritage but... unlike religious believers who are their close kin and (often) bitter rivals, nationalists are not bound by a body of authoritative law or a set of sacred texts. Beyond [national] liberation, they have no program, only a vague commitment to continue their history, to sustain a way of life." (33) In the testing times of crisis, nationalism—as we see currently in the Balkans—too easily gets turned against other nations, against internal minorities, aliens and strangers.

Almost by default, Walzer turns to civil society as the preferred option for the good life, both despite and because of its being "the realm of fragmentation and struggle but also of concrete and authentic solidarities." (34) The other proffered sites for the good life in modernity are each too all encompassing, too totalistic, in their solutions. Each needs a taming of their absolute pretensions by positioning them within the orbit of civil society. Thus, the market, when it is truly entangled in a denser network of larger associational life, when it conceives of multiple forms of property and ownership including worker or
community owned firms, is both consistent with and indeed should bolster civil society. In any event, some variant of a free market seems essential to liberal and democratic societies as we have known them.

In an important paradox, the state and civil society need each other. "No state can survive for long if it is wholly alienated from civil society... The production and reproduction of loyalty, civility, political competence and trust in authority are never the work of the state alone and the effort to go it alone... is doomed to failure." (35) Yet, the state is no less necessary to civil society. Only a self-limiting state which both recognizes and legally guarantees the range of civil, political and social rights can anchor the full legitimacy of a separate civil sphere. Moreover, as Walzer notes, "the state itself is unlike other associations. It both frames civil society and occupies space in it." (36) Walzer rejects any anarchist version of civil society. Indeed, state, economy and civil society in the modern world inevitably both interpenetrate each other and remain, at least analytically, independent. That civil society actually becomes more than merely analytically independent rests on its secure institutionalization and the vigor of the social movements in its defense. In this regard, Cohen and Arato helpfully remind us that "the norms of civil society—individual rights, privacy, voluntary association, formal legality, plurality, publicity, free enterprise—were... institutionalized heterogeneously and in a contradictory manner in western societies." (37) From this perspective, securing the stable institutionalization of civil society remains less the settled achievement of any societies (including the western democracies) than a continuing project.
The civility that makes democratic politics possible gets learned in the associational networks of civil society. The almost heroic citizenship ideal of the proponents of a direct participatory democracy becomes, in a citizenship primarily anchored in civil society, more modest in its claims and more diffuse in its institutionalizations. As Walzer argues the point: "But in the associational networks of civil society—in unions, parties, movements, interest groups and so on—these same people make smaller decisions and shape to some degree the more distant determinations of state and economy... These socially engaged men and women—part-time union officers, movement activists, party regulars, consumer advocates, welfare volunteers, church members, family heads—stand outside the republic of citizenship as it is commonly conceived. They are only intermittently virtuous; they are too caught up in particularity." (38)

Yet, "States are tested by their capacity to sustain this kind of participation—which is very different from the heroic intensity of Rousseauian citizenship and civil society is tested by its capacity to produce citizens whose interests, at least sometimes, reach farther than themselves and their comrades,[ citizens] who look after the political community that fosters and protects the associational networks" (39)

In the end, Walzer suggests that a notion of citizenship anchored in civil society might look "more like union organizing than political mobilization, more like teaching in a school than arguing in an assembly, more like volunteering in a hospital than joining a political party, more like working in an ethnic alliance or a feminist group than canvassing an election, more like shaping a co-op budget than deciding a national fiscal policy." (38)
Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato's densely argued theoretical study, *Civil Society and Political Theory* stands out as one of the very few contemporary works to essay thoroughly a complete and sophisticated theory of civil society in conditions of modernity. (41) I want to draw from it principally to present an ideal-type of a strong democracy version of civil society. Cohen and Arato look upon civil society as the privileged locale for the furtherance of democracy. They insist that we view civil society through a four part scheme or lens which distinguishes between: (a) the state; (b) the economy; (c) political society and (d) civil society. However, these essentially analytic distinctions (based, to be sure, on genuine institutional differentiations which point to quasi-autonomous spheres), should not blind us to the deep, pervasive mutual interpenetration of these four structural domains of society.

Drawing on Cohen and Arato, I want to contend that any real and serious project for the reconstruction of civil society will:

(1) pay attention to the threats of a colonization of civil society by the invading of its domain both by the over-regulatory state and a promiscuous expansion of the market metaphor beyond its legitimate sphere within the economy. We will want to probe, in our six case studies, the sensitivities of each of the groups to the threats to civil society from both state and society, the first tending to turn citizens into passive clients, the second making them a species of "consumers" of political goods.

(2) recognize the need for each of these four differentiated spheres to acknowledge and institutionalize its own self-limitation. Indeed, the very existence of an institutionally anchored civil society depends on the self-limitation of the state, its recognition of a legitimate autonomous domain of free public spaces. The state guarantees the existence of
civil society by a legal securing of the rights to privacy, communication and assembly (and also social rights such as access to those necessary minimal material goods which enable human agency). Clearly, the institutions and movements of civil society will frequently turn to the law, secured by the state, as a defense of their space. Such a self-limiting state acknowledges its circumscribed autonomy in fully shaping citizenship norms and decisions. At the extreme, self-limitation of the state will even accommodate civil disobedience. (42)

Conversely, the self-limitation of civil society, on its part, entails that it restrict itself, in normal circumstances, to projects of non-violent reform from below rather than revolution and that it accept an indispensable role for both the modern state and economy.

Indeed, as the successful non-violent revolutions in eastern Europe demonstrate, it took a confluence of both a mobilized civil society and a sufficient cadre of sympathetic office holders in the party apparatus and the state who were open to reform for the successful transition to democracy. Again, any pure fusion of civil society and the economy (which exists only as an imagined project in modernity, we have not really seen any real forms of it) seems both undesirable and incompatible with a differentiated modern world. Cohen and Arato coin the neologism, 'sensors', to refer to elite allies in the state and economic systems supportive of the programs of democratization or cultural revision initiated by social movements or institutions within civil society. Thus, for example, some people from within the formal political and economic institutions must be receptive (i.e., act as 'sensors') to the feminist, civil rights or ecological social movements to allow their agendas to move into the economy and the state apparatus: fighting glass ceilings, supporting affirmative action
programs, changing modes of communication from competition to cooperation, championing greater energy efficiency, recycling and conservation.

In a similar vein, Cohen and Arato address the self-limitation of civil society vis-a-vis political society:

From an analytic point of view, the distinction between civil and political society helps to avoid the sort of reductionism that assumes that political activities with a strategic dimension are easily generated by societal associations and movements or are somehow unnecessary. Paradoxically, an undifferentiated concept of civil society gives us a stark choice between the depoliticization of society (where the political is assigned to the state) and its over politicization (where all dimensions of civil society are held to be political). (43)

In sum, civil society's social movements and voluntary associations do not replace the need for a bureaucratic state nor for political parties, political action and lobby groups, and policy think tanks explicitly oriented strategically toward the polity and state. Political and civil society shade into one another and, necessarily, have two way bridges of influence and mediation. Nevertheless, they do not simply fuse, the one with the other.

(3) Social movements, in a strong democracy scheme, are not aberrant vehicles of political mobilization which short-circuit rational political action. They represent rational action every bit as much as does lobbying or crafting of legislation. "Social movements are a normal, albeit extratustitutional, dimension of political action in modern civil societies." (44) Indeed, the provocation of protest movements frequently places precise agendas before political legislatures which otherwise would never be there. The peace movement of the 1980's, to take one example, did further government movement toward disarmament. Without the civil rights movement of the 1960's there would not have been the Civil Rights Legislation of 1964-5. Yet, one should not over-estimate the power of social movements alone to anchor a
secure civil society as, once more, the eastern European experiences teach us in their transition to 'democracy'. We forget to our peril that "it is easier to suppress a society without deep organizational roots than a highly articulated one, even if the former is...mobilized." (45) Whatever happened, we might ask, to the highly mobilized Polish Solidarity? Or to Cory Aquino’s mobilized opposition to Marcos?

(4) recognize that civil society is not, itself, a purely neutral or virtuous terrain. It contains its own negativities and generates its own deformations. Surely, Michel Foucault’s image of civil society as a kind of carceral society, turning modern life into a panopticon of surveillance by civilian professionals (e.g. psychologists, criminologists, doctors) who decide who is creditworthy, what is healthy, psychologically sound, or normal behavior should be sufficient to aid us in avoiding any easy canonizations of civil society or viewing it as an essentially innocent’ victim’ being beaten up by those imperialistic bullies, state and market. (46) Civil society can degenerate, on its own steam, into mass society, driven by private interests and factions. Feeding on its own home-grown individualism, it can evacuate the larger social world of any sense of truly public or common goods. Both the Klu Klux Klan from an earlier period and the citizen militias of today, need we remind ourselves, were indigenous spawnings from the womb of civil society.

(5) insist that civil society, that amalgam of public and private realms, is a privileged locale for public deliberation and the formation of collective consensus and will. Jean Bethke Elshtain pithily captures this often forgotten truism: "A compilation of opinions does not make a civic culture; such a culture emerges only from a deliberative process." (47)
know that civil society is the bed-rock for social morality. Civil society represents much more than an ideal institutional bulwark to ward off threats from state and economy. We should look to it for something far more important and central than mere countervailing organizational power. It is the crucial seed-bed for the moral life. "It is on this terrain that we learn how to compromise, take reflective distance from our own perspective so as to entertain others, learn to value difference, recognize or create anew what we have in common and come to see which dimensions of our tradition are worth preserving and which ought to be abandoned or changed." (48)

Gianfranco Poggi takes this essentially Tocquevillian view of civil society as the primary school of virtue. Poggi reminds us: "Interpersonal trust is probably the moral orientation that most needs to be diffused among the people if republican society is to be maintained." (49) Our abstract duties to distant others when we are called upon to obey the state-made laws which coordinate a complex society (e.g. tax, traffic, food and drug, environmental laws) or exhibit fidelity to promise-keeping in the fiduciary contracts of the economy which anchor its flow of goods and services—these duties to state and market are sycophant on our experiencing richly in the associational life of civil society, a true sense for mutuality, trust, interdependent ties which bind, openness, reciprocity. This moral mentoring by civil society represents what the sociologist Alan Wolfe has called the"gift of society" without which any economy or polity loses its moorings (50) As we will see in a moment, when we consider the work of Robert Putnam, "even seemingly self-interested transactions take on a different character when they are embedded in social networks that foster mutual trust." (51)
(7) Finally, a strong democracy version of civil society sees it as simultaneously both a
terrain and a target of democratization. Not all agencies of civil society are, themselves,
internally democratic or embody a democratic ethos. Instead of an illusory ideal of direct
participatory democracy, we need to argue for support for vigorous associations, networks
and social movements which carry egalitarian and inclusive democratic potential for the
whole system. Democratization of civil society, in this view, opens up a grounding
framework to push for more participatory forms within political parties and representative
state and economic institutions. So, the project of civil society is not merely defensive,
protecting what Jurgen Habermas calls the life-world against the systems of state and
economy. It is also pro-active and aggressive, moving out of social movements or settled
organizations, working for alternative views of ecology, human relations or a normative sense
of modernity which bring moral norms (even religious values) back in to the very heart of
the economy and state to make them more responsive, more accountable, more inclusive in
the voices they consult and truly hear. In effect, a true citizen democracy encompasses much
more than a mere procedure of suffrage, vote and representation. It depends on a cultural
ethos of democracy primarily anchored in civil society.

Making Democracy Work

Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work takes up just this issue of a cultural ethos
of democratic civility. His larger questions reads: "What are the conditions for creating
strong, responsive, effective representative institutions? (52) This is the sort of question
being asked insistently in America today. To get tangible answers to this question, Putnam
studied (and regularly monitored through interviews and questionnaires over a twenty year
period) the emergence of the twenty new regional governments in Italy since the early
1970's. He compares the various Italian regional governments testing their administrative
effectiveness, bureaucratic responsiveness to citizens' requests or complaints, legislative
innovation, institutional performances in generating social outputs and citizen satisfaction with
their respective governments—each appropriately operationalized to generate a comparative
quantitative measure. Putnam shows, in his stunningly elegant research design, that effective
government varies, quite predictably and systematically, with the quantum of what he calls,
'social capital,' i.e. civic trust, thick networks of association, the vigor of norms of equality,
civic engagement and tolerance.

Making Democracy Work attempts an empirical test of the claims ingredient in
Tocqueville's classic interpretation of American democracy which postulated that "the civic
community is marked by an active public-spirited citizenry, by egalitarian political relations,
by a social fabric of trust and cooperation." (53) Putnam's comparative research demonstrates
clear and compelling statistical correlations between the volume and vigor of civic
associations and the percentage of active membership in civic organization in any given
Italian region and:

(1) The stability of democratic government in the region, in avoiding precipitous turn-over or
cabinet crisis;

(2) the extent to which political elites of varying political parties in the region were willing to
cooperate, beyond political ideology, to find pragmatic solutions to social needs—in short, to
make government work for their constituencies;

(3) citizen satisfaction with the performance of their regional governments;
(4) the usual measures of modern citizenship ideals of political equality and active
participation (e.g. rates of voting, involvement in city or school affairs);
(5) Citizen demand for more active police interventions or prisons. The higher the degree of
civic associationalism, the lower such demands.

It is worth noting that it seemed to make little difference whether these civic
memberships were directly political or oriented toward politics. Thus, Putnam observes that
choral societies, bird watcher groups, fraternal organizations and soccer teams—each teach
self-discipline and collaboration. His clear conclusion reads: "A dense network of secondary
association both embodies and contributes to social collaboration." (54)

There even seems to be an economic spinoff to a richly textured civil society. The
new highly productive 'industrial districts' in the so-called third-Italy (as constrained with the
northern industrial triangle in Turin and Milan characterized by large industrial bureaucratic
firms and the backward regions of the Mezzogiorno) show a unique combination of
competitive spirit and true cooperation. Such places in north-central Italy as Bologna or Prato
root their economic strength on craft-like, 'flexible specialization'. These now booming
industrial districts provide "an environment in which markets prosper by promoting
cooperative behavior and by providing small firms with the infrastructural needs that they
could not afford alone." (55)

What sets off these industrial districts from other parts of the Italian economy? "
Networks facilitate flows of information about technological developments, about the credit:
worthiness of would-be entrepreneurs, about the reliability of individual workers, and so on.
Innovation depends on continual informal interaction in cafes and bars and on the street.
Social norms that forestall opportunism are so deeply internalized that the issue of opportunism at the expense of community obligation gets checked. (56) Civics and a culture of civility drives the economy, not the other way around. In the long run, economies, like governments, prosper when they draw on civil networks for support, instead of eviscerating them.

Putnam's general conclusion informs my own contention about the location of citizenship primarily in civil society: "Norms of generalized reciprocity and networks of civic engagement encourage social trust and cooperation because...they reduce uncertainty. Trust is an emergent property of the social system as much as a personal attribute." (57) As this last sentence should make clear, it is not so much the case that citizens get the kind of governments they want or deserve (since, notoriously, people complain everywhere about unresponsive or corrupt governments) as that they get the kind of politics and government that their structure of civic institutions warrants and empowers. Paradoxically, we would more effectively foster a democratic citizenship if we focused our attention more on urging citizens to join and actively support the voluntary association of their choice (even if it is not directly political) than on efforts to get out the vote (important as this is for democracies. The rate of voting would automatically increase with the increase in the volume of civic associations.

Much more could be said about a full blown definition of citizenship. Citizenship can be fruitfully parsed by following T.H. Marshall's classic triad of the essential civil, political and social rights of citizens. (58) It can be usefully sketched, as Michael Walzer has done, by honing in on citizenship as the constellation of membership rights and duties in the nation
state. (59) Following Judith Shklar in her small book, *American Citizenship*, we could 
dissect the ways citizenship enhances dignity and participation by bestowing—especially on 
excluded groups such as blacks and women who were historically denied the suffrage—a sense 
of social standing and a right to inclusion in the world of working. (60) We have treated the 
discontents of American citizenship at greater length and proposed a scheme for a strong 
democratic version of citizenship in chapter one. Here, I want principally to argue that the 
key to the renewal of democratic citizenship will be found less in counting the number of 
people who vote than in the number of contexts, even outside of politics, where the right to 
vote—or its equivalent in the right to voice, dignity as social standing and influence—gets 
exercized.

**The Church and Civil Society**

We come to the last piece of our argument: civil society is the appropriate setting for 
the citizenship activity of the public church. The fate of the public church and a vital and 
public civil society rise and fall together. We should not be surprised that religious leaders 
such as the pope cast a careful eye on the future prospects for civil society. The 'secular' 
freedoms of speech, association, free communication, after all, are but the correlates in the 
secular realm to the originating religious freedoms to preach, to assemble for worship, to 
disseminate the message. The central and privileged church-society strategy for the churches 
should attend to the vigor and democratic civility of civil society, their social home. 
Undoubtedly, some of the cultural privatization of religion in modern society derives from 
defining civil society (the realm where religion finds its rightful niche) as, itself, essentially 
a 'private' sector.
Clearly, in modern societies the state is no longer the appropriate sector for the public church. Juridical separation of church and state, almost everywhere a touchstone of most modern state constitutions, is not only good for society and individual freedom of conscience, it is good for the churches. Established churches almost always lose essential ecclesial freedoms and the strong commitment of their members. Established churches notoriously exhibit low rates of religious practice. (61) No less obviously, the church will not find its proper social niche in the economy. Churches are non-profit organizations. An exaggerated sense of a market metaphor for the voluntary church could drive the church into an uneasy alliance with the wealthy, lead it to preach a debased gospel of wealth or to follow an organizational logic which undermines its central mission.

In a real sense, the churches were the original generators, at least in the Anglo-Saxon world, of civil society. It is their daughter. In England it came as the fruit of the dissenting reformers, in America as the result of the amazing proliferation of voluntary associations stemming from the voluntary church. Tocqueville called the American church, "the first of America's political institutions" because of the way it spawned paradenominational schools, welfare agencies, hospitals, moral reform societies. Moreover, the church taught its disciples, even when they were exercising a measure of self-interest, to look to a more altruistic communal good, to see their self-interest 'rightly-understood' as tying them to the fate of others. (62) The bell, the churches knew and taught, tolls for me as well as thee. The church has, thus, rightly been called the godmother of the independent sector. (63)

Even today, the majority of America's volunteers, members of the small-group movement, donors to philanthropies, providers of charity stem from or direct their
beneficence toward the churches. (64) Churches garner a higher degree of commitment than any other civil institution short of the state. No other organization in America can convoke as many people in any given week. No other voluntary organization gets as much money or time from its members and generates as much voluntary activity outside its own boundaries. None so accompanies its members from cradle to grave or pretends in the same ways to forge character and mold a self as a disciple. In Putnam’s terms, the American churches represent a tremendous’ social capital’ for the whole of society. As we will see in the following chapters, the paradenominational groups help the churches translate this social capital into efficacious action in the wider political order. Nor should we forget, as we saw in chapter two, that no all churches really see themselves as a public church.

Again and again, as an almost monotonous refrain, we heard in our interviews with the disciple-citizens in our six groups that they were in it [i.e. their citizen-activism] for the long pull. As the director for development of Bread for the World told us in one interview: "Art Simon made it a major point not to appeal exclusively to people’s self interest. What is done is done for obedience to God regardless of results. This gives the Christian a 'leg-up' on the general population. We are in it for the long haul." (65)

I do not think it was only by chance that the community organizing groups in America turned to the churches as an essential anchor of their activity. For as we saw in chapter two, religious groups in America carry, empirically, a greater degree of communalism and the communitarian spirit than most of their secular alternatives. Community organizers came to see that no other resource—not neighborhoods or other civic institutions—could rival the churches in providing the networks of solidarity and trust on which they depend in building
their community organizations. Nor was it, I think, by sheer chance that the churches
spawned or strongly supported the social movements in the 1980’s whether in dissident
eastern Europe or in Latin America which aimed at building the new civil societies. I was
struck when I read Francis Moore Lappe and Paul DuBois’ study, The Quickening of
America. Their book attempts to avoid joining the chorus of voices complaining about the
decline of citizenship in America or to whine about what isn’t working. They try to highlight
groups which are working, citizen-education groups which are already making a difference in
revitalizing citizenship. One can not miss that just about every other group they lift up had a
name such as Shelby County Interfaith, Joint Ministry Project, Valley Interfaith. Even many
of the groups with more secular sounding names such as San Antonio’s COPS (Communities
Organized For Public Service) drew their constituencies principally through the churches.(66)

Finally, it is probably no coincidence that when one reads resource mobilization
literature, churches or church members show up frequently as key actors in the peace,
ecology, civil rights and feminist movements. John Lofland, drawing on this resource
mobilization perspective in sociology, has sketched for us the ebbs and flows of the American
peace movement. Not only were four church-based peace organizations, for example, among
the top ten largest groups in the hey-day of the peace movement in the 1980’s( as they were
in the 1950’s, 1930’s and the teens of this century) but in low water periods of quiescent
decline during this century they soldiered on as other more secular groups faded away. They
became in each of the recurring cycles of peace mobilization throughout this century essential
building resources for a later social peace mobilization movement when the political and
social circumstances again became favorable. (67) They are in it, as we heard, for the long haul.

Much of the dramatic story of disciple-driven citizenship activism rarely gets told or we focus our attention almost uniquely on the Christian right groups (perhaps because they are so new and so successful in large-scale mobilization), forgetting that more liberal groups such as Pax Christi, Bread for the World or church-based community organizing not only hold their own in numbers and continue in operation but are, in some cases, actually expanding in numbers and activities. Again, we live in a time of globalization where, as Daniel Bell has famously noted, the nation-state is too large for many of our urgent problems and too small for many others. We need sociological carrier units which bear both the renewal of local citizenship and couple it with a global sense. The churches seem pre-eminently suited to this task of keeping a global sensibility alive. In any event, most of the citizenship responses in our sample of interviews focused almost uniquely on a local and global sense of citizenship. Millard Fuller, the founder of Habitat for Humanity captures this global motif in an interview he gave for our project: "I wear my citizenship in the United States very lightly because there is a citizenship greater than being a U.S. citizen. Jesus never had a U.S. passport. He was not a U.S. citizen and I think my citizenship in the kingdom is infinitely more important than my citizenship in the United States." (68) Habitat as we will see translates these global sentiments into real practices and behaviors when it insists that every local American Habitat chapter tithe to help build houses for the poor in the third world or when Habitat refuses to accept money which would exclude usage for third-world housing.
In trying to tell this story of the disciple-citizens in the next chapters, we need to heed Jose Casanova's voice in his award-winning study, *Public Religion in the Modern World*. Casanova demonstrates that modern religion, when it accepts its niche in civil society, need not be privatized. Even more strongly, modern religion can be an indispensable carrier-vehicle for modern democratic movements of human rights for all or the defense of civil society. *Amnesty International*, after all, was founded out of religious motivation and finds in the churches its major source of information about human rights abuses. Such public religion, to be sure, needs to acknowledge the rightful autonomy of the secular sphere, if it would be relevant in the modern world. But this does not mean that it has to accept the claims of these spheres to detach themselves completely from morality. Nor must it accept the relegation of religion and morality to the private spheres. By resisting the radical individualism that accompanies privatism, public religion insists on the links between private and public morality. In doing so, churches move from mere religious resistance to a more full-blown civic resistance, defending civil society and public input to policy discussions and decisions.

Much has been written, as we saw in chapter two, especially by philosophers from the camp of liberalism, about the need for a religious gag-rule in public discourse. In the name of secular equality and democracy, this liberal philosophy for public life seems to suggest that the religiously motivated must leave their deepest selves, their strongest convictions and motivations, their cherished religious symbols and metaphors which provide the narrative structure to their lives and actions outside the room when they sit down at the table of public discussion in what has been called, 'the naked public square'. Such talk about the need for a decent silencing of all religious symbols in public is, of course, nonsense, more—it represents...
a species of intolerance, a refusal to recognize the legitimacy of the other and a form of secular oppressive domination. It is quite clear from our interviews that for the overwhelming majority of our disciple-citizens, discipleship trumps. It is the main reason they give when asked to provide an account of why they are involved in citizen activism. Almost universally they claim that, in hypothetical cases of a conflict between their citizenship and discipleship status, they would privilege their discipleship status.

I give Casanova the last word in this chapter since his remarks are humanely sensible and a good summary of an account of how a deprivatized faith can revitalize citizenship:

Normative traditions constitute the very condition of possibility for ethical discourse and, fictional 'ideal speech situations' and 'original positions' notwithstanding, without normative traditions neither rational public debate nor discourse ethics is likely to take place. It seems self-evident that religious normative traditions have the same rights as any other normative tradition to enter the public sphere so long as they play by the rules of open public debate. Indeed, it is when other nonreligious traditions have failed, abandoned the public sphere, or abdicated their public role that religious traditions are likely to step in to fill the public vacuum. One after another, all the modern public institutions which at first tended to exercise some of the public functions traditionally performed by religious institutions abandoned their public normative roles: academic philosophy, the specialized social sciences, the universities, the press, politicians, intellectuals. Under such circumstances, one cannot but welcome the return of religion to the naked public square. (70)

Since social roles are embedded in institutions and organizations with their own organizational climates and cultures, we turn now in the following six chapters to inspect the way each of our groups shapes the norm of discipleship into coherent citizenship ideals and how they see their activity as somehow anchored in and contributing to the renewal of civil society.